Daily Report

Latin America

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Cuba

Officials Discuss Peace Accords, Timetables

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["Open Agenda" program hosted by Miguel Rivero; speakers identified by caption—live]

[Text] [Rivero] Good evening, esteemed viewers. As we have said, today's "Open Agenda" program is dedicated to the meaning, the significance, and the application of the southwest Africa peace accords that were recently signed in New York. As many of you probably remember, we discussed this subject last Dec 26. In that program we realized that due to the complexity of the topic and the diversity of subjects we should discuss, it was obvious that, even though we gave the program a little extra time, it would not possible to discuss in detail many of the topics covered in these agreements.

We even made a change in the program's normal format and opened telephone lines to receive calls from viewers. We have received hundreds of calls from practically the whole country. This gives us the marvelous opportunity to be in touch with our viewers. We want to mention two things that have gotten our attention. The first is the maturity of the questions that were asked. By this I mean to say that the questions reflect the interest of our people in this area. Secondly, the dedication shown to our internationalism, because many of the questions are related to our internationalist task.

Tonight we have several guests, some of whom were with us on the first program, to discuss tonight's subject. We also have a panel of reporters that have studied the questions and will try to pick out the essential ones.

With us is Comrade Carlos Aldana Escalante, secretary of the PCC Central Committee, who presided over a large part of the negotiation process, which, as you know, took place in different capitals in the world. Also with us is Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, a member of the Cuban delegation who also participated in the negotiation process; Alcibiades Hidalgo, who on several occasions—practically throughout the whole process—became spokesman for the delegation; and Comrade Jose Antonio Arbesu, deputy chief of the America Department, who also participated actively in this negotiation process.

On the panel to ask questions is Comrade Irma Caceres, from Tele-Rebelde's international editor section, who kept up with the negotiating process and was present at the New York signing of the agreements; and Francisco Forteza, who now joins the program and was, until recently, a correspondent for PRENSA LATINA in London, and was at practically all the rounds of negotiation. So we truly have a knowledgable panel.

Irma, I believe that you are the person—perhaps also to be courteous—to ask the first question.

[Caceres] I would like to begin by asking Comrade Aldana—who will probably remember that at the signing of the agreements in New York last 22 December, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said during his speech that the signing of the agreements was a miracle—I would like to know how you interpret Mr Shultz' statement, or why Shultz said this?

[Aldana] That is true. The U.S. secretary of state—not during his speech but at some moment during the ceremony—said that the signing of the agreements was a miracle. I believe it is a phrase used for the occasion. It was said at a very tense moment just after the Cuban speech, which established its position of principle, and the—I would say—parody of an answer given by the South African foreign minister. It was a very tense moment and it was a phrase used for the occasion by Secretary of State Shultz to try and ease the tension, because if anyone knows that this was an earthly and human process, it is the U.S. secretary of state.

Also, the United States played a role throughout this whole process which permitted them to know just how the situation was. Naturally, at the time of looking at the things that brought about this agreement, any simplification can be dangerous and could lead to an error or superficiality [as heard]. If you look at it like this, at first glance the agreements are the result of the negotiations. Of course, there was a diplomatic and political process which had an important role, but we have to ask ourselves: What led to the negotiations? Why were the negotiations possible?

Foremost, we have to say that to begin the diplomatic process it was necessary for the South Africans, who for one reason or another had eluded the negotiating tables, to have a willingness to negotiate. It was also necessary—and this is something I believe to be important—for the United States to be convinced that it was not possible to carry out a negotiation process without Cuba. This is to say that, up to this point—up to the initial phase of last January—the U.S. negotiators were trying to humiliate Cuba by reaching an agreement without a delegation from the Cuban Government forming part of the negotiations.

What led to this? What were the most profound causes that led to this? What was the true motivation that on the one hand created this willingness to negotiate in the South Africans and on the other hand led the United States to give up the idea of excluding Cuba from the negotiations? I believe that this can be explained by saying that the determining factor was the modification of the existing situation, the modification of the situation in the field. It is worth saying that it was the substantial modification of the military situation in favor of Angola and Cuba. I think that with Div Gen Ulises here there is no one more qualified to talk about this aspect of the affair than he is.

[Forteza] As a matter of fact, I have a question for the general. How did these modifications in the battlefield develop?

[Rosales] Forteza, we believe that there were three key moments in the battlefield which led the South Africans to the negotiating tables: first, the decision of the commander in chief to reinforce the People's Republic of Angola [PRA] with new troops; second, the decision to counter the South African offensive at Cuito Cuanavale; and third, carrying out the offensive to reestablish the Angolan border with Namibia. These three big elements took place at the specific moment when the Cuito Cuanavale crisis took place.

We should remember that in 1976—when the South African troops were pushed out of Angola, the withdrawal of our troops was decided upon by sovereign decision of Cuba and the PRA, and 50 percent of our troops were left alone—South Africa again began offensives in the south of the PRA. This is why we had to halt the withdrawal of our troops.

The remaining troops were placed along a line which stretches from the ocean in Namibia, in Loango, to initially (Matala). This line was later extended to Menongue. This is to say that it was a line approximately 700 km long. The deployment of our troops enabled us to strongly defend Angolan territory against South African aggression.

[Forteza] We have that line drawn on the map.

[Rosales] We can use the map to show it. It shows the line from Namibia, Loango, and—at first—(Matala); the line was later extended to Cuango and Menongue. As you can see, this line is 700 km long and 250 km from the border. As you can also see, in fROnt of our troops the South African troops continued to carry out aggressions.

[Forteza] They also occupied part of the territory, didn't they?

[Rosales] They didn't occupy the territory at this time. The occupation occurred at the begining of 1981, when the South Africans once again invaded Angola and increased their aggression toward the PRA.

This is the general situation that existed when we took advantage of the 1987 FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] offensive toward Cuito Cuanavale and (Mabinga) and began an operation deeper in the country. This is to say that the lines were 250 km into the country. As you can see on the map, the South African aggression began taking advantage of the organization of this offensive when [word indistinct] successfully and advanced some 150 km. The South African troops, with air and mechanized unit support—including its regular units—at the Lomba River, began to engage the FAPLA in battle, forcing the FAPLA to retreat.

The FAPLA units were composed of the best fighting units of the Angolan Armed Forces. It was a group that, when defeated, put the Angolan Government and its armed forces into a great deal of tension. This is why our country received, from all of our friends and allies, a request to go to the aid of the Angolan forces that were fighting at Cuito Cuanavale. This is also why, on 15 November, our commander in chief decided to reinforce the troops in Angola.

Brutal battles took place around Cuito Cuanavale, while at the same time the reinforcement and transfer of our groups in Angola began.

[Forteza] The reinforcements were sent by sea and air.

[Rosales] The first thing we did was send our most experienced pilots to Angola. We also sent tank and artillery units. I should add that 26 days after the commander in chief made his decision, the first tank units arrived in Angola. This shows the capacity and disposition we have for combat. I remind you that there was a high-ranking South African official who said we would need 6 months to put a large mechanized unit in Angola. However, the first echelon of the reinforcement group was in Angola in 26 days.

Without a doubt, this permitted the immediate reinforcement of Cuito Cuanavale. Cuito Cuanavale's reinforcement was not just with pilots. We also sent artillery and tank crews, and advisers to assess the FAPLA brigades that were fighting. It is necessary to indicate that in Cuito Cuanavale the fighting took place on the east end of the Cuito Cuanavale River. The enemy tried to defeat the group that was defending itself. The group was basically made up of three brigades. These units were Infantry Brigades Nos 21, 25, and 59.

The offensives carried out against these FAPLA units demonstrated the heroism of the Angolan Armed Forces when they put their infantry units against the South African mechanized units.

The fundamental characteristic of these South African actions is that they used the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] forces and the Namibian tactical forces as infantry while the South African troops operated in armored vehicles with air and long-range artillery support.

[Forteza] They used black Namibians?

[Rosales] Yes, black Namibians. This is supported by the fact that most of the casualties were black. They are the ones who carried out the combative actions. They were being used as cannon fodder.

The most notable battles are marked on the map. The more important ones are:

14 January: There was an assault on FAPLA Brigade No 21, which was pushed out of its position. However, the South Africans did not take advantage of this initial success and the FAPLA regained their ground. This was the last battle to take place without Cuban assistance.

As of this point, Cubans were present at all the battles that took place.

14 February: An assault was mounted against FAPLA Brigades Nos 25 and 59. The enemy attacked in a narrow sector. They were supported by some 150 armored vehicles, including 30 to 50 Oliphant-type tanks. They were able to penetrate deep into Brigade No 59, where the use of a Cuban tank company, along with FAPLA infantry, saved the battle by forcing the enemy to retreat. After this battle, it was decided to transfer Brigade No 21 west of the river and the defensive front was reduced, thus making it more compact. Without a doubt, this facilitated the repulsion of the enemy assault on Brigades Nos 25 and 59 on 20 February.

1 March: In a night assault carried out against FAPLA Brigade No 25, the enemy, in four columns, tried to break through the defensive positions but were turned back. After this battle, Brigade No 59 was also transferred west of the river. Thus, FAPLA Brigade No 25 kept an even more reduced area, which was reinforced by a complex system of obstacles. We managed to set up tens of thousands of explosive obstacles. The sappers made an enormous effort and managed to make a real mousetrap for the South Africans. Brigade No 25 was already supported by Cuban artillery, tanks, and aviation.

A real trap was made and the South Africans fell into it on 23 March. They were trying to attack from three different sides with over 100 armored tanks and cars when they fell into it. In the mine fields alone they lost several Oliphant tanks, AML-90's, and some of the tanks were captured intact after they were abandoned in the middle of the mine fields.

Prior to this battle, South Africa dedicated itself solely to antiaircraft harassment. It's enough to say that from December to March more than 400 attacks occurred. We should certainly add that the artillery attacks had very little effect.

Our aviation played an outstanding role during all these fights. From December to March, our aviation made more than 1,500 combat flights.

We can conclude by saying that in Cuito Cuanavale we were able to check, to stop, the South Africans, thus preventing them from destroying the group of Angolan troops and occupying their positions. All this was done with a minimal amount of casualties.

Nevertheless, we know from our exploration and from the South Africans themselves that they suffered 70 or 80 casualties during some of these encounters. That does not include the hundreds of casualties the black Namibian tactical forces and UNITA incurred.

As we are all aware, Cuba's strategy was not just to repel the enemy in Cuito Cuanavale, but also to create defensive conditions and reestablish the borders with Namibia, thus permanently expelling the South Africans from Angolan territory. This operation began on 9 March; by 9 April, we were able to cover more than 200 km of territory. I think we have a map on which you can clearly see the advancement of our troops in a southerly direction.

We think that the most outstanding event during this time was the energetic advancement made by our tank groups; the strong support they received from antiaircraft defense, which prevented the enemy from making incursions into the area; and also a few clashes with exploratory detachments in the areas of (Dongena) and (Techipa). This was enough to convince the enemy that the correlation of forces had changed.

Without a doubt, in the end this decisively influenced the use of aviation in striking a hard blow against South African positions in Calueque. There is no doubt that this caused discouragement among the enemy troops and helped end this battle. There is no doubt that this created the conditions for certain victory for us.

I think that these aspects are very....

[Forteza, interrupting] These aspects are very important.

[Rosales] These and the defense of Cuito Cuanavale are the most outstanding aspects that opened the road for the revolution.

[Forteza] What made it possible for this to occur now? Why couldn't a military operation of this type have occurred earlier?

[Rosales] We can't say that a progressive effort was not made. These events did not occur only during the months prior to the defense of Cuito Cuanavale. If we look at the situation that existed in previous months, one can see that we were increasing our efforts, preparing the forces, perfecting the organizational [word indistinct] of our units. Our cadres undoubtedly acquired an expertise that allowed them to attain this superiority, not only materially, but also in the training of our cadres to undertake this successful operation.

[Caceres] I would like to ask a question, Rivero. We only speak about Cuito Cuanavale, but we've seen that it's a combination of things, places, and regions, not just Cuito Cuanavale, right?

[Rosales] Yes, we should keep in mind that the Cuban troops not only acted in Cuito. The entire group of troops were moved to guarantee the reinforcement of Cuito and to create the grouping that, in the end, would represent the greatest danger to South Africa. This was the coup de grace which occurred in the Cunene region. It showed its offensive nature when the enemy saw us move our aviation grouping toward (?bases) that were constructed in a very brief time. This gave our capabilities an operative nature and it placed the enemy's troops in great danger in the tactical area of the border.

[Caceres] We were talking to Alcibiades Hidalgo about this great offensive and the results of the war. It was very costly for South Africa even though the international press in general does not refer much to this. I think it would be good to discuss this aspect. What did this war cost South Africa?

[Alcibiades Hidalgo, PCC Central Committee official] Yes, this is one of the least-discussed topics when an explanation is sought for the conflict in southwest Africa.

What Gen Ulises described had immediate repercussions in southern Africa in economic and political terms because of the growing numbers of human lives lost.

It is fair to say that South Africa's aggressive activity, especially toward Angola, kept increasing South Africa's military budget over the last few years. The war in Namibia and, above all, the aggression against Angola were constantly more costly for South Africa.

Those studying the South African situation have said that during the past 10 years, the past decade, the military budget grew in truly gigantic proportions. Botha's current government took office in 1978. Since 1978, the government has increased the military budget 6 times, until it has reached extraordinary proportions.

For example, in 1980 the military budget was barely $1 billion. I use the word "barely" as a euphemism. Nevertheless, in 1988 their military budget was 4 times as large. Its value in South African currency was 8.2 billion rands, which is approximately $4 billion. Just the aggression against Angola in the years 1985 to 1986 cost South Africa, according to very objective calculations, $6.7 million.

This indicates that despite the evident benefits that South Africa has acquired from the more than 70 years of colonial exploitation of Namibia, the continuation of this exploitation, extensively linked to the aggression against Angola, has resulted in a burden that is heavier each time for South African society.

This is clearly reflected in the deficits of the South African state budget, which have been higher each time during the past few years. South African currency has been devaluated during the past 8 years to 50 percent of its value; the foreign debt, which was not very high at the beginning of this decade, reached $22 billion in 1986. It is estimated that the war against Angola will cost South Africa approximately $2 billion a year per capita [as heard] in this century. This is another reason we should not ignore the analysis...

[Rivero, interrupting] That's another important element.

[Hidalgo] It's an important element. In the political sphere, the cost in terms of lives—white lives, which is what interests the South African regime—was greater each time.

I looked up some statistics today, figures that the comrades from the MINFAR [FAR Ministry] supplied, which indicate that in one of the battles cited by Gen Ulises—the one on 25 February 1988 in Cuito Cuanavale—the Cuban exploration team was able to definitely determine that South Africa sustained 79 casualties, deaths, and 26 injuries.

This has a high domestic political cost. The best explanation that we could give now would be a couple of paragraphs I would like to read from an article from a South African magazine entitled [name indistinct], a weekly magazine. It published a very interesting article in August this year...

[Rivero, interrupting] You mean last year.

[Hidalgo] Pardon me. It was published in August 1988. It was entitled, "Angola: Everything Is Forgiven." It describes the situation in a place of tribute located in a hilly area south of Pretoria, where they inscribe the names of the soldiers who have fallen in the war against Angola.

There is a part in the magazine that says that.... [changes thought] Every imaginable last name appears there in the magazine. Then they give a list of the more common last names in South Africa, names such as Botha, (Van Bietz), (Smietz), and others. The name of every man that has fallen in battle is marked with a star. It says that as of 1975 the number of stars began to increase and that they believe there over 1,000 names inscribed in that place.

[Caceres] Are they all there, Alcibiades?

[Hidalgo] Well, that is the newspaper version. Of course, we believe that not all of them are there.

[Arbesu] The white ones are there.

[Hidalgo] Above all, the white ones are there. As a matter of fact, the magazine says so. It says that the names of the black soldiers from some of the battalions of the local Namibian forces, that is to say Southwest Africa, do not appear on this statue. They also do not state the loss of armament. This monument does not tell the story of all the money this war has cost South Africa.

It conludes by saying: Is this worthwhile? This became a [words indistinct] for that racist society which does not take into account the blacks who have died.

[Rivero] Here we have two important elements: the aspect the general was explaining to us, and this aspect of the cost for South Africa. These are elements to take into account with respect to why South Africa went to the negotiating table. It would be interesting if we could give details.

[Forteza] I have a question for Comrade Arbesu regarding the negotiations. Could you describe some aspects of the negotiations, and some details of these complex talks which began in May in London?

[Arbesu] Well, they were complex negotiations. We have to take into account that when the Cuban delegation began to participate directly in these negotiations, it was conditioned by the fact that the mediator, which was the U.S. Government, had already been accepted. As has been said on more than one occasion, the U.S. Government is a [word indistinct] mediator who, for some time, actively supported—logistically and militarily—UNITA. The United States does not recognize the Government of the PRA; it keeps—to say it nicely—close relations with the South African Government, and has had a historical disagreement with Cuba, for reasons already known to the viewers, for over 30 years.

So then, this made the negotiations more complex. To this we can add the fact that when we became involved in the negotiations, the idea for a complete withdrawal of Cuban troops was already in the works. I think it is important for us to mention here something which is already known: the disposition our people had, as our commander in chief said at the Nonaligned Movement meeting in Harare, to remain in Angola as long as was necessary, especially while apartheid, which was the reason which provoked the situation in southwest Africa, existed. Apartheid is what caused the military aggression toward Angola and put the security of the Frontline nations in danger.

Angola and Cuba acted in these negotiations on the basis of the principles outlined in the communique between the Cuban and Angolan Governments signed in February 1972 and on the joint declaration which was signed in March of 1984.

That is where the absurd idea of linkage [preceding word in English], which was being stated at the time, was discarded. It was precisely established that a global solution was possible, as long as this solution would guarantee the independence of Namibia and the security of Angola. The Angolan and Cuban delegations worked on these negotiations according to these principles. If these two conditions were met, it was conceivable that a total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola could take place in stages.

I would say that this is part of the complexity of these negotiations.

The other thing that added to the complexity of the negotiations was the nature of the South African delegation. This is a delegation that was representing the fundamental flow of power in South Africa. They participated in the supreme organ that made political and military decisions in that country. They represented those people in the so-called South African National Security Council. The South African delegation was not a homogeneous group.

[Rivero] There was no cohesion.

[Abresu] There was no cohesion. The highest level of the general staff of the armed forces, military intelligence, military counterintelligence, political intelligence, and the Foreign Ministry were represented in the delegation. At one time—I don't remember when, but I think it was at the first meeting in New York—the chief of the South African police arrived. I think the delegation has also represented security...

[Rivero, interrupting] I think it was at the second meeting in New York.

[Abresu] He appeared at the second meeting in New York. He showed up once and he never showed up again. A minister was there once, too. I think it was the justice minister. He showed up at one meeting. This resulted in a lot of recesses which complicated and prolonged the process...

[Rivero, interrupting] They were trying to conciliate certain interests.

[Abresu] They wanted to conciliate certain positions and then present them to South Africa, the South African Government, to those people who make the decisions in the country, who apparently also could not reach an agreement.

We also have to take into account that some internal problems were brought into this negotiation process by the South Africans. They brought some internal problems from their country. For example, the situation in the electoral process in South Africa...

[Rivero, interrupting] Municipal elections are another example.

[Abresu] Municipal elections and the struggle between the party in power—Botha's party—and the Conservative Party complicated this process.

I think that the most important thing to stress here is the basic initiatives in this process which Cuba and Angola developed. The fundamental progress that was made is the result of Angolan-Cuban initiatives.

For example, what has been called the moment in which the possibility clearly opened for progress in the negotiations—the adoption of the principles in New York in June 1988 and the majority of the principles that were agreed upon—these were proposed by Angola and Cuba.

The structure of the agreement package, the tripartite agreement, and the Angola-Cuba bilateral agreement is the result of an initiative of our two governments.

As an initiative, our two governments presented a timetable for the total withdrawal of the Cuban troops as early as May. Also, we stated—since it was the sovereign decision of Angola and Cuba and was a gesture of goodwill and seriousness toward the negotiations—that we were willing to have the withdrawal verified by a group designated by the secretary general of the United Nations.

[Caceres] Arbesu, would it be a good moment to...[changes thought] We have tried to ask the most important questions for the viewers, even though we may not always refer to them, but that has been the way we have worked. Why were the talks held in so many capitals? [Words indistinct] decisions, why so many capitals?

[Arbesu] The talks were held in many capitals not because of a specific interest to see the world but because of the problems that come with trying to negotiate with the South Africans. For example South Africans have trouble going to different places in the world. As a result of their apartheid policy, they are sanctioned by different countries. For example, they do not like New York because the United Nations is there and that makes it a hostile place for them.

The first meeting was held in London; but later, by the sovereign decision of political and cultural organizations in London, a concert was given for Nelson Mandela and so the South Africans could not go back to London. Geneva was also troublesome for them.

[Caceres] Yes, the United Nations have headquarters there.

[Forteza] Although that is where they felt most comfortable.

[Arbesu] It is where they felt most comfortable. It was more favorable for them than being at the United Nations because, if you will remember, what the United Nations has in New York is the political representation. What the United Nations has in Geneva is not the political representation. This forced us to move around.

There was a later phase in which they proposed meeting in places that were nonsense. It was impossible to meet there. These were places that were not...[changes thought] They were very close to South African politics and Angola and Cuba could not go to these places. Also, there were no conditions, because of their politics, or basic facilities that our delegations needed to work and communicate with our countries.

Basically, the South African's difficulty in getting along with the rest of the world—since they are rejected and isolated from the rest of the world—was what forced us to move around the world.

[Forteza] It is obvious that these were complex and difficult negotiations. I would like to ask Comrade Aldana a question about the more critical moments of the negotiations. Could you talk about them?

[Aldana] First of all, I think that it would be good to say at this point that there is a correlation between the events described by Gen Ulises and the negotiation process. We cannot believe that the military actions ended and that the negotiations then began. [Words indistinct] at the first moment in which the Cuban delegation first agrees to go to the negotiation tables in January. This is to say, the first time there was a Cuban representative, which in this case was Comrade Risquet, to go to the tables where there were talks being held—in this case with the Angolans, the South Africans were not present—was in January. The process was influenced by the actions carried out in Angola, that is to say the military operations.

It is very important to stress the following: The political will of accepting, rejecting [as heard] Namibia—that is, implementing UN Resolution 435/78 and, first of all, the political decision to withdraw from Angola, to leave the Angolan territory that had been invaded—came about during the course of negotiations.

We cannot say that the South Africans had made that decision when they began to negotiate. That decision came about during the course of negotiations.

I saw in one of the questions that a viewer was wondering why we sometimes say tripartite and other times we say quadripartite. This has to do with this problem. If we look at the process in a basic way, we see that there were four countries negotiating. From that point of view, any negotiation is quadripartite. However, the United States invented other euphemisms. They said that there were no Cuban and Angolan delegations, but rather a Cuban-Angolan delegation. This is how we began to negotiate, by forming part of the Angolan delegation. We kept that structure, and the head of the delegation was always an Angolan. However, in reality, and in the crucial moments of the negotiations, we were a state. We were a party representing Cuba while Angola was being represented by their delegation.

I would say that the negotiations went through an inevitable phase of controversy and ideological confrontation. It was inevitable. It was logical that representatives of such different ideologies—I would say insoluble, such as in the case of apartheid and Angola, the Cuban

Revolution, the paradoxical mediation by the United States—would hold an ideological debate with controversy. They especially did this during the first stage.

In that sense, the most acute moment—what I think the comrades felt was the most critical moment of the negotiations—was in Cairo, at the Cairo meeting. The South Africans went there with completely absurd demands.

[Rivero] The Egyptian press also attacked them.

[Aldana] Yes, they also received no (?support) there.

[Rivero] [Words indistinct]

[Aldana] They had some irrational demands. For example, they asked us for a list of Cubans that married Angolan women who may have been naturalized as Angolans. Why were they asking that question? What interest was it to them?

This shows to what point the mentality, the idea of apartheid, includes a low opinion of the African peoples, in this case of the Angolan people. To them a group of people, an undetermined number of Cubans nationalized as Angolans, constitutes a threat to them. They are considered to be a greater threat than all the Angolan people put together.

I remember a conversation on this. I pointed out that there are 10 million people in Cuba. If you're concerned that several Cubans will remain in Angola, there are still 10 million in Cuba.

They made such absurd statements in an attempt to link the withdrawal of Cuban troops to the withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory. They gave 6 weeks to reconciliate the situation with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA.

This required an ideological and political response, which was led at that time by Comrade [name indistinct] and Comrade Risquet. I think it was a very solid and very convincing response.

I should tell you that during that discussion [words indistinct], the U.S. delegation agreed with the arguments we presented, which was a perfectly rational position in view of the South African stance.

That was the most critical moment. We later learned the explanation from Western publications for an event that we all saw from the table where we sat. The table was square. The South Africans were facing us. The Angolan-Cuban delegation was here and the U.S. delegation was at the head of the table.

We saw a little piece of paper being passed hand-to-hand between the main chiefs of the South African delegation. We all clearly saw this. We didn't know what the paper said but later, a few months later, we read a West German publication that said the paper had a question from one of the chiefs of the South African delegation. He asked: Should we withdraw now? He was asking if they should leave the talks. According to that publication, the South African defense minister, Magnus Malan, answered yes.

South African Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha, who headed the South African delegation at that time, responded by saying: We should wait. South Africa's Van Heerden, who ultimately headed the negotiations, answered: No.

That response may reflect what we are talking about: a lack of unity. The man who said "no" is the man who headed the negotiations and who participated in them while representing the interests of South Africa with a minimal amount of professionalism and realism, which we cannot ignore.

As Comrade Arbesu said, the fundamental initiatives at all times came from the Cuban-Angolan delegation. We must also add that in negotiations all parties involved have to contribute something. All the parties have to point something out; otherwise it's not a negotiation and no understandings can be reached.

In this sense, during the discussions on what was actually happening—and especially after the blow at Calueque, which Gen Ulises described as decisive—the South African's conduct toward the negotiations themselves and toward the concrete suggestions that were being considered at that time became more realistic.

There were also other moments...

[Rivero, interrupting] At the Cairo meeting there were some press reports saying that the negotiations were being saved due to the intervention...

[Aldana, interrupting] Yes, yes. There were several reports...

[Rivero, interrupting] There were reports from the South African press.

[Aldana] Yes, there were reports of who saved the negotiations. That moment was critical because we responded to that string of nonsense by simply saying: Since these topics have been brought up, we then place the matter of apartheid on the table. When will you end apartheid? When will Nelson Mandela be freed?

This was an issue that we tried to keep in the background of the negotiations because it did not strictly affect what we were discussing, but we laid it on the table.

Under those critical circumstances, we then presented an Angolan-Cuban initiative because we had reached a standstill, a virtual standstill. If an initiative was not made at that time after the two parties had spoken strongly during the negotiations, the process would come to a standstill. It would stop. We presented a group of principles that we could use as a basis for an agreement.

Everything else is fiction. I have also read that the Soviet comrades are the ones who saved the negotiations. A report said that a Soviet observer who was outside the negotiations was the person who intervened at a critical time. This is a little melodramatic and is not much of a compliment to the Soviet Union, which has contributed much to this process. They have provided important material assistance for all the military operations we have mentioned. However, some reports attributed a gesture to the Soviet Union that it did not make and gave it credit for something it did not do.

This reflects their enthusiasm to downplay the role played by Angola and Cuba in the negotiation process. Depending on how you look at it, there were other critical moments.

I think the most critical moment of all, and this is where the decision was made whether or not to continue the negotiations, was when our delegations had to properly answer South Africa's absurd statements and at the same time keep an open mind about the possibilities for understanding. I think the Angolan-Cuban delegation fulfilled both tasks.

[Caceres] As long as you are discussing the critical moments, Comrade Aldana, the viewers have had questions about the role of mediator played by the United States. How do you see this?

[Aldana] Well, it is a paradoxical and contradictory role. I think that accepting the United States as mediator showed a realistic attitude by Cuba and Angola. The South Africans would not have accepted any other country or government as mediator.

Another aspect to look at was whether that role was in keeping with the fact that the United States would continue, and for that matter continues, to aid UNITA. Accepting them to play that role, accepting them within this paradoxical framework that Arbesu was describing, was a realistic attitude.

I believe the United States played the role of mediator with accuracy and professionalism. Throughout the negotiation process we met people that, defending their ideas and positions, acted with certain ethics, which in the same way deserves some respect. At the same time, the United States frequently acted without restraint in favor of the South Africans. They lost the sense of balance corresponding to a mediator and acted in a [word indistinct] favorable way toward South Africa. This diminished the efficiency of their gesture when we, in the discussions, [word indistinct] tried to see their point.

The United States staggered—and, frankly, performed far below what could be expected from diplomatic professionals—when their interests, as an imperialist government, were dominated by the idea of a global solution to the conflict we were discussing. In other words, they were ruled by their obsession to get the Cuban troops out of Angola. That obsession, which is the obsession of the Reagan administration and was well-stated in Comrade Malmierca's speech at the signing ceremony, practically excludes the other elements in the United States' view on this problem. These elements, such as Namibia's independence and Angola's security, are truly essential.

That obsession, at a given moment, stunned the U.S. delegation and caused them to, as we would say in Cuba, lose their goat. In other words, it caused them to lose the composure and calmness required in a situation like this.

I do not know if you remember, but on one occasion we were saying that it looked as if they were the Latins. You know that we Latins are famous for having a temper, while the Anglo-Saxons are known for being more imperturbable. They were staggered and overcome with eagerness to achieve a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops that were at that time...

[Caceres, interrupting] They were prejudiced against the...

[Aldana, interrupting] Yes, during the first stage they acted [words indistinct] toward Cuba and Cuba's intentions, and were wondering whether Cuba would favor an agreement or would try to block it. I believe they soon realized they were wrong.

I would say that we also broke some plans and the possibility for talks. [sentence as heard] Our reasoning at first was not [words indistinct] so that in a peculiar convergence of interests such as this, an understanding could be reached. So in this sense we could say that we also had some prejudices that we did away with during this process.

[Rivero] Aldana, there are also some people, as we have mentioned before, who simplify things by saying that this negotiation, this agreement, was made possible because of international opinion, which created a climate of detente and which practically forced the negotiators to reach an agreement.

[Aldana] I think this is a superficial simplification of the situation; it is also erroneous because this undeniable situation, which has been created recently from an undetermined number of global agreements between the large powers, is identical to the case of Afghanistan. It is the same situation as that in Central America, where

truly reasonable conditions have not yet been reached. In some cases, the situation has become even more complicated at a time when an attempt is being made to reach an agreement. The context of the situation exerts its own influence, but the determining factors are the position of the forces fighting, the position of the combatants, the position of those who are actually determining events in the territory. These factors are important, but one cannot expect a single one of these to resolve the problem that must be resolved by the people, their representatives, movements, and organizations.

I think it would be very erroneous to simplify this in such a way.

[Caceres] There was a culminating moment in the negotiations and there was also a culminating moment in the military area, too.

[Aldana] Naturally.

[Caceres] I think that...

[Rivero, interrupting] I want to explain to our television viewers that our program includes a detailed explanation of the process of returning our troops. We had anticipated that we would run out of time and we will extend the program beyond its normal time frame.

[Forteza] That is good because I have a question for Comrade Alcibiades on the final result of all these negotiations. The agreements are of vital importance, correct?

[Hidalgo] Yes, the final packet of agreements signed in New York on 22 December is the main point of interest. I think that the phone calls we have received have primarily expressed an interest in the agreements.

Nevertheless, I would like to say as an introduction that throughout the negotiating process during the past 8 months, there were several times in which agreements were reached, small steps taken, in order to reach the final agreement.

This first moment, which was already mentioned here, was the agreement to adopt the "Principles for a Solution to the Conflict in Soutwest Africa" at the New York meeting, which was an Angolan-Cuban initiative that combined a series of principles that were acceptable to all parties involved. During the negotiations these principles were translated into concrete agreements.

Of these concrete agreements, the first was adopted in Geneva in August. Concrete measures were also adopted, the most important of which was an end to the hostilities between the troops. This measure was maintained throughout the negotiation process and it created a climate that facilitated the course of the negotiations.

This agreement in Geneva also includes, as a very important aspect, the unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola. Their troops had been there for years. At one time the South Africans erroneously and absurdly attempted to link their withdrawal from southern Angola to the withdrawal of Cuban troops. That was the first step in their escalation. This was simply and emphatically rejected. We told them: To continue the negotiations, you will have to withdraw from Angola first and then we will continue the talks.

This took place on 1 August. The South African troops withdrew from Cunene Province and on 30 August they left Cuando Cubango Province. In this sense, there were no concessions.

One of the first tricks that resulted from the so-called South African humor was when they promised a date of 1 November for the independence of Namibia. It was not fulfilled because of domestic reasons.

[Rivero] One of the reasons was the municipal elections.

[Hidalgo] They were going to hold municipal elections. It was not convenient for the national party.

Later, the Brazzaville protocol was signed. This was one of the most difficult stages of the agreements. To attain this, five rounds of talks were necessary. In the penultimate round of talks, the South Africans stormed out of the talks...

[Caceres, interrupting] They stormed out.

[Hidalgo] This has been explained here on previous occasions. A protocol was signed in Brazzaville with some important points, such as the exchange of prisoners, which is expected to occur with the signing of the tripartite agreement [as heard], which I will soon discuss.

The joint commission was also established there. It will continue the negotiating process.

In conclusion, after these early documents were signed, we arrived at the tripartite and bilateral agreements signed in New York.

The tripartite agreement is the more general one. It contains the global elements that set forth a peaceful solution to the entire region. It applies to Angola as well as Namibia.

It includes the application of Resolution 435 for 1 April 1989, South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, and Angola's and South Africa's commitment to cooperate to apply Resolution 435. They are the countries with the closest links to this process. However, there are other countries that have a border with Namibia, and they have responsibilities with respect to returning refugees, border security, and so forth.

It also refers to the bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba which was signed at the United Nations immediately after the tripartite agreement was signed. We have here a chart, and I think it would be useful to refer to it; it compares the organizations that were created for this process.

This is the other chart, isn't it?

[Caceres] Yes it is. The other chart is the comparison.

[Aldanda] This one compares the organizations that are designated for Angola and Namibia, based on the United Nations' decision. From it I want to stress the following: We can clearly see what the differences are between each force, as specified by the United Nations.

In the case of Angola, the petition by Angola and Cuba, including the petition that was presented at the beginning of the negotiations themselves, a verification of the withdrawal of Cuban troops would be overseen. For this reason, a specific force was created. This unit is known as UNAVEM [no further expansion given] and is composed of 70 unarmed civilian observers—excuse me, they are unarmed military personnel—and 20 civilians. Their job is to verify that the Cuban soldiers—there are 50,000 of them in Angola—return to Cuba in the time frame established by Angola and Cuba. UNAVEM also has a group made up of representatives from the observer countries. That group is headed by a Brazilian general. There is a group from different nations representing the different regional groups from the United Nations.

At the same time, the implementation of Resolution 435 for Namibia's independence goes into effect. This is shown in the second column of the chart. This part is expected to be overseen by a unit called UNTAC [no further expansion given], which is the UN assistance group for the transition period. The UNTAC, which is very different from the previous group, is an armed combat force and is the group that is being discussed now by the [words indistinct] as our comrade, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro, explained in his 30th anniversary speech. The UNTAC, as you can see here, is made up of 7 battalions plus 2,300 support regulars, and a large group of civilians. The civilians are tasked with overseeing the elections and should also supervise South Africa's administration of the territory throughout the transition period.

The chart also lists here, a little lower down, the countries that are supposed to make up UNTAC. This is also one of the things that is now under discussion.

With respect to the prisoner exchange, which is a subject that has been of interest to the people, this was established in the protocol called the Brazzaville protocol. It states that with the signing of the tripartite agreement, the parties would exchange prisoners of war. This matter is now in the process of being carried out on the basis that all prisoners being held, by one side or the other, will be returned. In other words, there will be a joint exchange, but not on the part of the prisoners. [sentence as heard] The exchange will have to be at the same time, which is customary at the end of a military conflict.

Right now we are in the middle of the verification phase to establish who should be the soldiers to be exchanged during this phase, as outlined in the agreements.

I also wanted to speak briefly about the bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba. This agreement was signed at the United Nations' headquarters immediately after the tripartite agreement was signed. It establishes, between the Angolan and Cuban Governments, the end of Cuba's internationalist mission in Angola. I understand that the timetable for the withdrawal of our troops will be explained later in the program at greater length. However, I just wanted to refer to the chart that Rivero is showing us now on the screen. It shows how this timetable evolved from the negotiations.

I think that this chart demonstrates the willingness to negotiate and the rapprochement of the parties. This began with a proposal by Angola and Cuba for 48 months, which at that moment was being considered as the best timetable for the return of the troops, considering our transport capabilities and guaranteeing the absolute security of the Cuban troops and the situation in Angola throughout the withdrawal...

[Rivero, interrupting] I think it's also a position that resulted from the negotiations.

[Hidalgo] It's also a position to...

[Rivero, interrupting] Negotiations then begin and it is stated...

[Hidalgo, interrupting] The South African position was at the other extreme. They wanted the Cuban troops to pull out in 7 months. Actually, they actually dared to propose that the troops withdraw in less than 7 months.

[Rivero] [Words indistinct]

[Hidalgo] Throughout the months of negotiations, as can be seen on the chart, these positions began to evolve while we maintained the premise that this final timetable would have to have two essential elements: the security of the Cuban troops, and the security and integrity of the PRA.

The final result, as we know, was a timetable of 27 months, which, in our opinion, fulfills those essential requirements. In this sense, I think that the development of the timetable—it would be worthwhile to mention this—as Comrade Aldana said, was one the moments that most demonstrated the interests of the U.S. delegation in their position; not as mediator, but as an interested party. On the matter of the timetable, the United

States participated in the talks with enthusiasm, with the hope of making the timetable shorter. This was their primary interest in the negotiations. I think that the act of attaining that timetable, which guarantees our fundamental objectives, demonstrates not only Cuba's negotiating position, but also its firmness on the positions it has maintained throughout the talks.

[Caceres] We will now continue with the military topic. Comrade Gen Ulises, could you explain how the deployment and the return of the Cuban troops will take place?

[Rosales] Yes, of course. As we all now, the total withdrawal timetable is 27 months, from 1 April [1989] to 30 June 1991. It is now common knowledge—it has been made public—that we have 50,000 men in Angola. According to the agreements signed, as a sovereign goodwill gesture made by Cuba and the PRA, 3,000 Cubans will leave Angola before 1 April. The farewell ceremony for our combatants is currently being prepared and...

[Caceres, interrupting] When will they arrive?

[Rosales] They will arrive in Cuba on 10 January and we will have a welcoming ceremony on 11 January.

[Rivero] They will arrive on the 10th, the night or the morning of the 10th?

[Rosales] They will arrive the day of the 10th and the ceremony will be held on the 11th.

In this way, as of 1 April, we will have 47,000 men in Angola, which constitutes the program for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops, not counting the gesture of withdrawing the 3,000 men. I think we have a plan, which can be seen on the chart, that can be divided into parts on the matter of implementing the redeployment. Some people have asked about this.

The group of Cuban troops will depart north of the 15th parallel and, in a certain sector, there is an adjusted line of 30 km south of Namibia, 30 km south of the 15th parallel to the Cuenene River. From that point, it continues along the 15th parallel. Not until after the 31st of July of 1989; that is in 4 months. [sentence as heard] Three months later, this group will be relocated north of the 13th parallel. This also includes a sector of the adjusted parallel, 30 km south of the 13th parallel, from the Atlantic Ocean to the 16th meridian. This will not occur until after 31 October 1989.

The return of our troops to Cuba will take place in four stages. We have a chart which clearly shows the timetable.

The first stage: This includes a 7-month period from 1 April through 31 October 1989. At this time, 22,000 troops will return to Cuba.

[Rivero] Could you please repeat that?

[Rosales] The first stage is a 7-month period.

[Rivero] It is 7 months long.

[Rosales] It goes from 1 April to 31 October 1989. During this time, 22,000 men will return to Cuba; in addition to the 3,000 men now returning, this will total a withdrawal of 25,000 men.

[Rivero] That is a total of 25,000 men.

[Rosales] This is 50 percent of the total amount of troops. A group of 25,000 men will remain in Angola.

The second stages includes a 5-month period from 1 November 1989 to 31 March 1990 during which time 8,000 men will return, for a cumulative total withdrawal of 33,000 men. This is 61 percent of the total number of troops. A group of 16,000 men will remain in Angola, which is 34 percent of the total number of troops.

The third stage involves a 6-month stage from 1 April to 30 September 1990. At that time, 5,000 men will return to Cuba. This represents a cumulative total of 38,000 men being withdrawn from Angola, which is 76 percent of the total number of troops. A final group of 12,000 will remain in Angola, 24 percent of the total number of troops.

The fourth stage is comprised of a 9-month period from 1 December 1990 to 30 June 1991. At this time the last 12,000 men will return to Cuba.

The withdrawal timetable of the Cuba-PRA bilateral agreement covers the stages for the withdrawal of the personnel.

The weaponry and technology will be withdrawn during a period of 27 months, but it will be done in accordance with the combative disposition and security of our troops, as well as having the necessary capabilities for transport. That is to say...

[Rivero] Will the transport be via sea and air?

[Rosales] Yes, it will be via sea and air. This aspect was not part of the negotiations. The withdrawal of our troops is being done, as we know, based on maintaining our combative disposition, thus keeping our troops strong to the end. That is the reason we are maintaining a group of 12,000 men in Angola. They will have sufficient technology and weaponry available to react if our withdrawal is obstructed at any time.

[Rivero] I have a question, General. We have seen on the map that there are not only military personnel but civilians there. What is their situation?

[Rosales] The ones we call collaborators?

[Rivero] Yes, the collaborators.

[Rosales] As our troops are withdrawn, the civilian collaborators will be withdrawn at the same time. In other words, they will be withdrawn along with the troops.

I was saying that, in principle, the personnel would be withdrawn after having served their military service. I believe that there were some questions about this?

[Rivero] Yes, there were. This means that everyone will have to serve their time?

[Rosales] Yes, everyone will serve their time. However, there will be some exceptions that, in the interest of the military mission, will be decided on later. For the most part, however, they will serve their internationalist mission. This also means that a relief must be kept to maintain the combat readiness of the units that need to have that readiness until the mission concludes at the end of the 27 months. This means that if we calculate, to the 50,000 men presently in Angola we must add...

[Rivero interrupting] We have that on the chart here.

[Rosales] Yes, we do. There are some personnel that should go to fulfill their missions, some that will go or leave on vacation, and some that will be evacuated for health reasons. All of this put together will increase the number of men to go into and be withdrawn from Angola to over 72,000.

[Rivero] During the whole process?

[Rosales] During the whole process.

At the same time as our troops are being withdrawn on 1 April and the implementation of Resolution 435 goes into effect, the withdrawal of the South African troops from Namibia will begin. I believe that the chart shows the more important aspects of the South African withdrawal.

During the 1st 6 weeks of Resolution 435's application and 1 April, the forces on Nambian soil—which we know as the Namibian tactical forces, and the civilian forces—will be deactivated. There will be some 12,000 South Africans remaining in Namibia. Also, 9 weeks after 1 April—this is the period of 13 May to 2 June 1989—8,000 South Africans will be withdrawn.

During the 12-week period of 3 June to 23 July 1989, only 1,500 South Africans will remain on duty at the bases in Grootfontaine and [Oshibelo]. Then, 7 months and 1 week later—that is, 7 November 1989—those 1,500 South Africans will be withdrawn and all the military bases will be closed.

I think it is important to note that between 4 and 7 November 1989, the elections for Namibia's constituent assembly will take place, and on 7 November, Namibia's constituent assembly will hold its meeting.

[Caceres] Comrade General, when will the remains of the Cuban combatants that fell in battle be returned to Cuba?

[Rosales] Well, it is expected that with our troops' withdrawal from Angola, the remains of our fallen comrades will also be returned. It is also expected that the honors they deserve will be rendered to them. In other words, we expect their return during the course of the withdrawal's first year.

[Rivero] That means they will be returned this year.

[Rosales] That is correct. I think that the people will soon be given all of the details on their return.

There is a very timely topic that is of great interest because it is being discussed even now while we are here. It's the matter of the application of UN Resolution 435. We have had questions on the application of Resolution 435. People have asked about the modifications that others have tried to make to this resolution. Perhaps Comrade Aldana can tell us more about this.

There have also been other questions. Forgive me for bringing in another topic. We have had questions from the population on UNITA activities in the interior of Angola and whether this represents a danger to the application of the agreements. You mentioned that the United States has committed itself to continuing assistance to UNITA.

[Caceres] I would like to add that there is interest in knowing what would happen if violations occur while the resolution is being implemented.

[Aldana] There is undoubtedly connected to the battle that is currently being fought in the Security Council to prevent financial considerations from forcing a modification to Resolution 435 as it was conceived, which was explained in detail and clearly by Comrade Fidel at the main ceremony marking the 30th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution held in EXPOCUBA.

This resolution is (?the product) of the Western world. No one knows the South Africans better than they do. [Words indistinct] seven battalions. There is sufficient reason to say that it may be even more necessary now than before to provide guarantees to SWAPO that just and honest elections will be held.

At the same time, this phenomenon, this battle that is taking place, obviously creates concern and uneasiness about this agreement and the risk and danger that the agreements may be violated.

Comrade Alcibiades made reference here to the creation of a joint commission as a result of the Brazzaville agreement. The joint commission will be created. It was agreed that the commission will be made up of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. The United States and the

Soviet Union will act as observers. It is a commission. There are no mediators. The parties are equal. The three countries involved in this understanding will have a forum where they can examine misunderstandings, difficulties, and problems, and it will not force or prevent anyone from directing himself to the organs of the international system. I'm referring to the UN organizations, specifically to the UN Security Council, which is the highest body responsible for these agreements.

This is an international understanding that helps solve a global problem in a region of the world. Its purpose is to put an end to a colonial situation. It will reestablish the border to a country that has been attacked and invaded, as is the case with Angola, and it will reestablish its sovereignty. In this sense, this matter concerns the international community and the UN Security Council because the focal point of these agreements is Resolution 435.

That is why a violation of these agreements, a lack of compliance with these agreements, is a violation of international law, and it is up to the international community, the UN Security Council, to take the measures that are advisable against those attempts to alter this commitment.

Regarding UNITA, as Comrade Fidel has also explained, we have an attitude of respect toward the decisions made by the Angolan Government pertaining to the internal situation of that country. We are confident that the Angolan Government has the wisdom and courage to apply the correct solution to this problem, which concerns African traditions, Angolan traditions, and its history. This conflict is actually an internal conflict.

When the interference in this process ends... [changes thought] This interference currently comes from the United States, and it converts this internal Angolan phenomenon into a focal point in the interests of the United States. We have seen this with UNITA, which, as you know, has established an alliance with South Africa and the United States in this conflict.

That is why we feel confident of the degree to which the international community—as reflected in the current battle underway in the Security Council—is aware of its responsibility and is willing to fight with all its means so that these understandings can be fulfilled, so that public opinion will not be mocked, and so that the sacrifices and blood that has been shed for so many years by Namibians, Angolans, and Cubans will result in the independence of Namibia and the security of Angola.

That is why I think that the concerns of our people are legitimate in the battle underway. We must remain alert. We must remain on top of the situation, use all our abilities to persuade public opinion, and use the facilities the United Nations provides.

On the other hand, our bilateral agreement says very clearly that if the tripartite agreement is not fulfilled and the accords are violated, we will consider ourselves free to not fulfill our agreements. All of these prearranged matters are in accordance with what Comrade General Ulises was saying: We will maintain, to the end, a strong unit capable of defending itself, that will not be a temptation to anyone, and that will be able to carry out any mission.

I should tell you that, knowing the process that we have had to go through, the interests in this matter have converged. We believe that despite the difficulties that may arise or the obstacles that may turn up along the way, this process should end with Namibia's independence and with the fulfillment of the agreements as they were conceived within the logical frameworks of a process of struggle in which the parties have agreed. Not all of them will easily give up the interests they have held for so many years, but the strength of the international community can successfully see that these agreements are fulfilled.

[Caceres] Excuse me, it would also be terrible if South Africa and the United States did not fulfill their international commitments, right?

[Aldana] It is almost inconceivable, but vigilance by the international community plays a decisive role anyway, as well as timely and effective action should such a case arise.

[Rivero] Well, regrettably our time is up and we will not be able to comment on some of the subjects we had wanted to. We want to tell the viewers that many of the questions have been on Namibia's internal situation and the political forces in Namibia.

We plan to offer a program to more fully discuss this matter. We do not want you to think that we are ignoring it; it is simply being deferred because, regrettably, we have not had time to delve into it.

So, this brings us to the conclusion of our program, "Open Agenda." We want to thank our guests for being here and we invite you to join us again next Monday.

Union Leader Claims Threats, Mistreatment Used
PA1301013989 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 0041 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Mexico City, 12 Jan (DPA)—Joaquin Hernandez Galicia ("La Quina"), leader for life of the Mexican Oil Workers Union, accused the Public Prosecutor's Office this afternoon of forcing him to sign a "confession" by threatening to massacre the workers.

"La Quina" made his first statement to the judge in the case at the eastern detention center in Mexico City and denied that he had admitted storing and smuggling 200 Uzi machineguns and 25,000 rounds of ammunition, as the authorities claim.

Hernandez Galicia, who was arrested after a 10 January shootout between his personal guards and military forces, said that he was "threatened" by his interrogators to confess "at least some of the prefabricated crimes, which was an illegal trap."

"They threatened to force the men to work through bloodshed and shooting, because they knew that the oil workers had stopped their activities," he said to Jose Luis Garcia Vasco, Eighth Penal Court judge, who heard the statement at the detention center.

Even though Hernandez Galicia admitted that Public Prosecutor's Office officials treated him "courteously" during the interrogations, he asserted that others arrested with him—a total of 50—were mistreated because he heard their "screams and moans" from his cell.

He added that he decided to sign the confession so that his comrades "would no longer suffer" and so that "the workers were not killed."

PAN Leader on Formation of Opposition Front
PA1201125089 Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 5 Jan pp 1-A, 29-A

[Report by Rafael Cienfuegos]

[Excerpts] Mexico's National Action Party [PAN] President Luis H. Alvarez announced that the opposition political parties will form a single front to demand effective and far-reaching changes in the Federal Electoral Code. They will also insist that the talks on the matter be held in the Chamber of Deputies. He said PAN's and the other parties' congressional coordination boards are meeting to decide ways to give greater force to their demands. Their common interest is to open up the path for democracy in the country. At a news conference, Luis H. Alvarez announced he will meet again with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari next week to inform him that the opposition will not make concessions regarding the citizens' right to vote and to have their votes respected. Therefore, the opposition's electoral victories must be accepted. [passage omitted]

The purpose of Alvarez' news conference was to announce PAN's viewpoints and its achievements in the past congressional sessions. He said: For the first time, the opposition is chairing committees. For example, PAN is chairing the committees on creating cooperatives, on consumer goods, and on libraries. For the first time, we managed to end the president's power to incur foreign debts by placing limits on the revenues law and eliminating the so-called carte blanche.

We managed to force the government to consult with the legislative branch before selling any parastate companies.

PAN won four seats on the Permanent Committee, based on its total number of deputies in the Chamber of Deputies. As a whole, the opposition has 9 of the 19 seats in the lower chamber.

PAN deputies staged acts of civil disobedience during former President Miguel de la Madrid's last speech and during President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's inauguration ceremony. PAN also staged sit-ins at Zocalo Plaza, the Independence Column, and in Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon, and other places.

Government Signs Rural Project Agreements
PA1201171089 Mexico City EL NACIONAL in Spanish 7 Jan 89 p 7

[Summary] Within the framework of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's policy of concertation with the rural sector, the federal government has signed 43 agreements with 247 peasant organizations from 30 states. The states of Aguascalientes, Colima, Zacatecas, and the Federal District have not been included in the agreements. The policy contemplates carrying out 334 projects at a cost of 543.167 billion pesos and is aimed at boosting the agricultural sector and combating the social disparity existent in the rural areas.

Police Arrest Six Drug Traffickers
PA1201141989 Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 6 Jan 89 pp 5-A, 37-A

[Summary] Federal Judicial Police have arrested six people caught inside a Culiacan restaurant while arguing over the price of 4.1 kg of opium paste used for manufacturing cocaine.

Arrested were Arturo Venegas Flores, Longino Hernandez Ayala, Adrian Portillo Martinez, Cornelio Uribe Elias, Hilario Zamarron Chavez, and his brother Eleazar. A .45-caliber pistol, two trucks, and the opium were confiscated.

El Salvador

FMLN Claims Honduran Involvement in Morazan

PA1201150089 (Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0000 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] On the night of 9 January an enemy patrol entered this department, Morazan, from Honduran territory. The patrol clashed with an FMLN unit between Torola and San Fernando and a firefight ensued.

It could not be confirmed whether the enemy patrol suffered any casualties or whether the troops were Honduran or Salvadoran. The incursion by enemy troops, whether Salvadoran or not, from Honduran territory implicates the Honduran Army and Government in a war that is totally alien to their interests. The United States is interested in involving the Honduran Army in El Salvador's (?internal affairs). Once more, we call on the Honduran people and press to verify our reports on these actions which involve Honduras and its army in a war the Salvadoran Army has already lost.

This latest incident on 9 January between Torola and San Fernando here in Morazan worsens a situation that has already become worrisome; on 4 January another patrol from Honduran territory clashed with guerrilla forces.

The Honduran Government and Army have tried to deny the fact by claiming the confrontation occurred in Honduran territory. We urge the Honduran people to express themselves and to prevent the meddlesome Yankee policy from (?involving them) in another war. [words indistinct]

Coprefa Notes FMLN Leader's Death, Casualties

PA1301003589 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 2351 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] San Salvador, 12 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—Coprefa reported today that nine rebels and one soldier were killed, and four soldiers wounded, during recent clashes between the Army and the FMLN.

The military report said that among the dead guerrillas was FMLN leader Emperatriz Aleyda Mendez, alias "Morena," who died in a clash in the eastern town of Nuevo Eden de San Juan, San Miguel Department.

According to the Army, Mendez was a leader of the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP), one of the five guerrilla organizations composing the FMLN, and was the political-military chief in eastern El Salvador.

The report holds the FMLN responsible for the death of Army Corporal Pedro Guevara Romero, who was a member of the 3d Infantry Brigade.

According to the Army, the guerrillas shot Cpl Guevara Romero while he was on leave.

Spokesmen of the 3d Infantry Brigade, with headquarters in San Miguel, reported that six guerrilla members died and four others were wounded during a fight near Ciudad Barrios.

Two other guerrilla members died in a clash in the town of Sesori, an area of intense conflict, in San Miguel Department, the Army reported.

FMLN Plans 'Disruptions' in San Salvador

PA1301001189 San Salvador DIARIO LATINO in Spanish 12 Jan 89 p 3

[Text] Various FMLN-FDR front organizations and several labor unions are planning disruptions and terrorist actions in San Salvador on a massive scale to call for a national rebellion and general labor strikes and to protest the presidential elections to be held in March 1989.

A report issued by the Intelligence Department of the Salvadoran Armed Forces states that the aforementioned activities will be conducted within the next few days by the National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS), the Bread, Land, Work, and Liberty Movement (MPTL), and several National University student organizations, among other groups.

The report adds that according to a military analysis of the situation, these groups, which are described as "shock" groups, intend to hinder the electoral process, to disrupt democracy, and to destabilize the government.

The Army report says that documents discovered by the Army reveal several FMLN-FDR plans, which are scheduled to be carried out by its front organizations. These plans include making false statements regarding human rights violations by the Armed Forces, especially regarding conscription and military surveillance around the National University.

The Armed Forces reiterate their determination to continue defending the country's sovereignty, to maintain public order, and to guarantee the safety of all the country's inhabitants in order to strengthen democracy and find the road to peace.

* FMLN Leaders on Role of War, Elections

32480042A Mexico City LA UNIDAD in Spanish 20 Nov 88 p 15

[Article by Carlos Caceres]

[Excerpts] The situation in El Salvador has reached a crucial point, according to Major Joaquin Villalobos and Major Leonel Gonzalez, members of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) General Command.

"The current conditions now offer an opportunity for the social struggle to pave the way for a social explosion," Villalobos explains, "and within that context, our

role abroad is to join efforts with other Latin American countries and the different political forces in order, insofar as possible, to reduce the costs of that explosion and that confrontation." [passage omitted]

Referring to the Esquipulas II process, Gonzalez said: "It played an important role in the region. It was a courageous gesture in search of the independence of the peoples of Central America. In that sense," he continued, "the United States has to learn to coexist with real democracies in Central America and throughout Latin America. In that sense, we see that it is possible to revive Esquipulas II.

"Our position on dialogue is not to impose conditions; it is the government that has done so," Gonzalez said. "There have recently been statements by President Duarte to the effect that in order for them to sit down with us, we have to lay down our arms. That view is not shared by any social force in El Salvador.

"All social forces believe that the FMLN is a force and that in order to find a political solution, both sides have to be included. In El Salvador, we must find a way to solve basic problems. Such a solution must be found by all Salvadorans. From that standpoint, our attitude toward elections is to question them because they do not signify any alternative to the serious crisis now besetting El Salvador."

For his part, Villalobos said it is not contradictory to speak of dialogue while accelerating military activity. "El Salvador is involved in a war that has not ended. On the contrary, it has worsened. This does not mean that in order to open up a dialogue, we would first have to end the war. The war has causes and as long as those causes are not resolved for the different factions, the war will go on. We believe that the situation now developing will open the way to the extent that the other side has fewer possibilities for forwarding its plans. This in turn opens up possibilities for a real negotiating process."

Elections are not an alternative, the two Salvadoran guerrilla leaders say. "What is more," Villalobos states, "the elections were part of the model of counterinsurgency imposed on El Salvador by the Americans. Five election processes have been carried out, but the situation that has developed is that the medicine has become part of the disease!"

Villalobos went on to say that there is a tendency on the part of rightist groups in his country to regain leadership of the government and fight over control of the Army with the Americans. In other words, instead of becoming a factor alleviating the situation, elections now tend to be a factor generating problems for the very process itself."

"In that sense, the result of the elections in terms of the number of votes (on this we agree with the parties of the FDR [Revolutionary Democratic Front]) is of no importance. The importance of participation by the Democratic Convergence is to make the most of the election space in order to disseminate the political solution, educate the population and make the parties that are part of the alliance stronger." [passage omitted]

Finally, Villalobos and Gonzalez emphasized that it was never suggested that the military solution in El Salvador consisted "of watching the guerrillas liberate the country starting from the north until they reached the cities. The people are the main protagonist," he said, "and to the extent that the strength of the people's movement begins to make it a protagonist, there are possibilities of definition. The situation now exists. Conduct of the war is not solely military. It has an international arena, a political arena and a military arena, which is both tactical and strategic. Obviously, this could no longer be achieved from Morazan or Chalatenango. We could not have an exchange with Latin American governments from the war fronts."

Three More Mayors Resign Following Threats

PA1201141289 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 1200 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Three more mayors have resigned during the last few hours, bringing the total number of mayors who have left their posts to 42.

According to this morning's report, Jose Atilio Henriquez, Nationalist Republican Alliance mayor for Estanzuelas, Usulutan Department, publicly resigned. Mayor (Humbeto Quijuenza) also resigned his post in Oratorio de Concepcion, Cuscatlan Department. Also left vacant was the mayor's post in the village of Agua Calinte, Chalatenango Department, where Gonzalo Tejada announced his resignation.

Death threats were reportedly received by the mayors of Tenancingo and Santa Cruz Michapa—both in Cuscatlan Department.

Guatemala

Cerezo Returns From U.S.; Cabrera on Summit

PA1301023489 Guatemala City Cadena de Emisoras Unidas in Spanish 0100 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Unattributed report]

[Text] Guatemalan President Marco Vinicio Cerezo has returned to this country and, for a change, he was smiling and showing off a tan. The president went to the United States to settle some family affairs and rest for a while.

It is well known that President Cerezo left Guatemala to prepare the speech he will deliver to the Legislative Assembly commemorating his third year in the executive branch. The president returned at 1330, though the foreign minister had personally reported that the arrival was scheduled for 1430.

Many journalists were not able to catch sight of the president because he arrived ahead of schedule, and they were left high and dry. Presidential palace reporters said: Well, you know how Foreign Minister Cabrera is.

President Cerezo and Foreign Minister Cabrera will visit Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte on 15 January to discuss the possibility of holding the presidential summit on 20 February, it was revealed today by Foreign Minister Cabrera himself. He said they will inquire about President Duarte's health and ask if he is willing and available to participate in the meeting on the date proposed by Guatemala. The date has been accepted in principle by the other Central American governments.

Guatemala has proposed that the other meetings, meaning the technical commission's meeting and the foreign ministers' meeting, start on 9 February and end on 20 February, the day of the presidential summit, the foreign minister announced today. Cabrera added that our country has proposed that all the meetings be held within that framework to make some progress in the regional peace process. The summit's postponement does not affect the peace plan for the region, but it does delay its implementation, Foreign Minister Cabrera stated this morning. Based on the decision approved in Mexico City by the executive commission, comprised of the Central American foreign ministers, the peace plan must be carried out. Therefore, he expects that an agreement will be achieved concerning the proposed dates.

Honduras

Azcona Holds News Conference in Washington

PA1301002589 Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras Network in Spanish 1120 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Report by Jacobo Goldstein on a news conference by President Jose Azcona on 11 January in Washington D.C.—with portions recorded]

[Text] First, President Azcona was asked about the presence of counterrevolutionaries in southern Honduras and the discussions about this with U.S. President-elect George Bush:

[Begin Azcona recording] It was necessary to discuss this question with President-elect Bush because it is a Honduran problem that Hondurans did not want and did not create. It is a problem affecting our domestic life and development. The status of the Honduran counterrevolutionaries is of increasing concern to Honduras. The fact that we signed the Esquipulas II agreement, with terms that were spelled out in the Costa Rica document of 16 January 1988, which in turn led to the Sapoa document, has served to encourage the Nicaraguan fighters to cross over into Honduran territory.

One effect of the Costa Rica document was the cancellation of the military aid that was going to the contras [words indistinct]. All this has facilitated the departure from Nicaragua of a group of people who find themselves in a very unusual situation in Honduras, because while they are not political refugees, they could be described as such.

This concerns not only Honduras and the United States but also, primarily, the Sandinist government. That government must establish democracy so these people can return to Nicaragua to conduct their struggle in the political arena and not in the military field. [end recording]

The Honduran president was asked what he considered to be the essence of the counterrevolutionary problem:

[Begin recording] The problem has several aspects; it is a complex problem. Many of the people who were recruited in Nicaragua and began fighting the Sandinist government are peasants. They fought the Sandinist government because they did not agree, for example, with the fact that the Sandinists took over their crops; or because they preferred to fight the Sandinist army than be recruited into it. Often their reasons were not ideological, but merely a reaction against a system with which they did not agree.

It has been said overseas that Honduras is at fault. However, the counterrevolutionaries are Nicaraguans. They are a product of the situation inside Nicaragua. There are no Honduran counterrevolutionaries in any country and there are no Honduran political refugees in Guatemala, El Salvador, or Nicaragua, so we do not feel responsible for the Central American situation or anything like that. [end recording]

President Azcona was asked whether he believed Mr Bush would accept the contras in Miami if the worst happened, and what he thought about the cancellation of the Central American summit which had been scheduled for 15 and 16 January in El Salvador:

[Begin recording] We have expressed our concern and have requested that the new administration find a solution as soon as possible. This was accepted when the Sapoa agreement was signed and the cease-fire was implemented. It was accepted by the president of Nicaragua when he signed the Esquipulas II agreement on 7 August 1987 and the San Jose document on 16 January 1988.

I spoke with Costa Rican President Arias on 5 January regarding the suspension of the Central American summit. He had been trying to contact us on the evening of 4 January. At 1000 on 4 January, he spoke with my secretary and told her why he wanted to speak to me.

Later that morning Salvadoran President Duarte telephoned to tell me that President Arias had given valid reasons for postponing the Central American summit meeting. At 1400 that same day, I spoke with President Arias and he confirmed his position. He also sent me a fax early on 6 January. We were surprised by the postponement request. I am not saying that President Arias' reasons for the postponement are not important. [end recording]

President Azcona was also asked about Mr Bush's reaction to Honduras' proposal for an international peace force along its borders with Nicaragua and El Salvador:

[Begin recording] We received an appropriate answer. There will be a new administration on 20 January and the new administration will deal with the problem. It has to study the problem and it will keep in touch with the Honduran Government. [end recording]

Another question was: What does the Honduran Government expect from the Bush administration?

[Begin recording] [Azcona] We expect to receive aid from President Bush just as we have received aid from President Reagan. We hope that the aid does not decrease. The military aid has been decreasing in the past 4 years, and we hope that military and economic aid will increase again. It should be noted that it has not been the U.S. Administration but the U.S. Congress who has issued the aid, especially the military aid.

[Unidentified reporter] [Words indistinct] of CNN. Do the contras in Honduras represent a threat to the Honduran people?

[Azcona] If they were not receiving humanitarian aid, they would, as I have said. The passing of humanitarian aid through Honduras is not only humanitarian but in the interest of Honduran security. [end recording]

Azcona was also asked about the outlook for Central America as a whole if the Sandinist government maintains its present policies:

[Begin recording] If the current situation persists, it will not be fixed by Mr Bush and could not have been fixed by Mr Dukakis, had he been elected. It could not be fixed by anyone. If the domestic situation persists, it is because the Nicaraguan people do not agree with that situation. [as heard] The situation will generate contras, lies, demonstrations, and the rest, and there will be no peace. [end recording]

Azcona was then asked about Bush's response to his proposals:

[Begin recording] There is no specific plan and he has his reasons for that. He assured us, however, that he is prepared to help us solve the problem and to do whatever is possible to improve inter-Central American relations. [end recording]

He also referred to the military treaties between Honduras and the United States:

[Begin recording] [Azcona] In Honduras, international treaties have to be ratified and approved in practice by the legislative branch, by the National Congress. There is a protocol calling for permanent buildings for Honduran military bases. In Honduras there are no U.S. military bases; there are such bases in large European countries, but not in Honduras. The protocol is being discussed and will be presented to the Honduran Congress and there will be public debate on it, as is usual in Honduras. The National Congress will decide whether or not to approve it. But there is no granting of military bases to the United States. We have been negotiating for 4 years on whether to build permanent structures or to continue using tents.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] of LA TRIBUNA and Voz de Honduras. My question is about CBS' 8 January 60 Minutes program, in which many things were said about Honduras. One strong statement made in the program was that the aid sent to Honduras has not reached the people.

[Azcona] I am going to explain that. I believe that documentary was malicious, irresponsible, and based on poor sources of information. [Words indistinct] the U.S. aid for Honduras. Statements were casually made to make the American people, who do not know how we function, adopt a position against Honduras and even against the U.S. Administration. [end recording]

Returns From Visit 12 Jan

PA1201234689 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 2243 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 12 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—Honduran President Jose Azcona Hoyo today returned from the United States, where he had gone on Monday to bid farewell to Ronald Reagan and meet with President-elect George Bush.

Azcona talked with Bush about U.S. economic and military aid and the Central American political situation, and asked him to help Honduras solve the problem involving the 13,000 Nicaraguan contras who live in Honduras.

Bush asked Azcona to give him some time to prepare new policies in the White House.

The president was accompanied by Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Contreras, Government Minister Enrique Ortez Colindres, and Armed Forces Commander General Humberto Regalado Hernandez.

Army Clashes With FMLN Salvadoran Guerrillas

PA1201124789 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 2111 GMT 11 Jan 89

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 11 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—The Honduran Armed Forces reported today that on 9 January Honduran Army troops had an armed clash with FMLN Salvadoran guerrillas in Honduran territory.

The Honduran Army report, which does not mention casualties on either side, states that the skirmish took place at the Colomoncagua border area, a region in which some 10,000 Salvadoran refugees have settled.

According to the military report, the guerrillas "secretly" entered Honduras with the purpose of going to the refugee camps and small Honduran border area communities, allegedly to rest or obtain supplies, but were evicted by Honduran soldiers.

On 4 January, a Honduran Army second lieutenant was wounded during an armed clash with Salvadoran rebels, who also had entered Honduran territory, according to military spokesmen.

According to the official report, the guerrillas sustained some casualties on that occasion. The number of casualties was not specified, and it is not known if any guerrillas were killed, because the FMLN rebels took the wounded to Salvadoran territory.

Armed Forces Communique

PA1201163789 Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras Network in Spanish 1840 GMT 11 Jan 89

[Communique issued by Armed Forces Public Relations Directorate on 11 Jan 1989]

[Text] The Honduran Armed Forces Public Relations Directorate reports to national and international public opinion the following:

1. At 1900 on 9 January, a National Army border patrol had an armed clash that lasted several minutes in the Honduran area of Colomoncagua—in the village of Concepcion on the Pichigual River—with an FMLN subversive contingent.

2. The criminal and subversive Salvadorans secretly entered the country to head for refugee camps and for small Honduran border towns that the seditious elements continuously terrorize and use to rest or to secure supplies. The subversive contingent was intercepted by the National Army patrol, which immediately engaged the FMLN force in combat until it was forced out of Honduran territory.

3. National and international public opinion can see in this way how FMLN seditious elements treacherously continue to carry out incursions and violate our territory. These activities will always be firmly repelled by the Honduran Armed Forces to safeguard our sovereignty and our national integrity and security.
Tegucigalpa, 11 January 1989
Public Relations Directorate
Armed Forces of Honduras

Central Bank Analyzes Economic Situation

PA1101151189 Tegucigalpa Cadena Audio Video in Spanish 1200 GMT 10 Jan 89

[Summary] "A preliminary analysis of Honduras' economic situation for 1988, drafted by the Central Bank, reveals that the government's budget deficit continues to grow. According to the analysis, in November 1988 the government deficit had reached 480 million lempiras—87 million lempiras higher than the 1987 deficit."

The analysis added that efforts to prevent increases in government expenditures have been hampered by the inflexibility in decreasing current expenses—principally salaries and wages, foreign debt servicing, and several expenses tied to income by certain fixed percentages.

Current expenses have increased 15 percent over income during the last 3 years. The rate of savings decreased from 19 percent in November 1987 to 12 percent in November 1988, a net decrease of 7 percent.

Panama

Delegates Withdraw From Houston PCC Meeting

PA1201180089 Panama City Televisora Nacional in Spanish 2300 GMT 11 Jan 89

[Text] The technical meeting in Houston, Texas, of the Panama Canal Commission [PCC] members was unsuccessful. The Panamanian representatives withdrew from the meeting after the United States insisted that Juan Sosa participate in the event. The Panamanian delegates have reiterated their willingness to meet with the U.S. delegates provided that Sosa, former President Eric Arturo Delvalle's representative, is not present.

Canal Commission Offers Aid to Employees

PA1201193289 Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA in Spanish 12 Jan 89 pp 1, B-2

[Report by Cesar E. Gomez Marin]

[Text] Panama Canal Commission [PCC] Administrator Dennis P McAuliffe says the most serious problem the canal faces today is the legal action that the Finance and Treasury Ministry plans to initiate against the Panamanian employees of the U.S. Government and private organizations in Panama. These organizations are not handing over to the internal revenue department income and education taxes withheld from salaries. He made the

statement in a memorandum sent to all Panamanian employees, referring to the actions that could be taken on the matter and the PCC's help to its employees under the situation.

McAuliffe recalled that on 15 December 1988, he had commented on the possibility of these measures by the Panamanian Government and that when some of the employees were taken to court for nonpayment of these taxes, he had decided—and the PCC is prepared, according to assurances given by PCC Board of Directors President William Gianelli—to offer the affected employees any help that may be at his disposal.

McAuliffe added that because of the seriousness of the situation, he and Gianelli will continue to "make every possible effort to remove income and education taxes from the package of sanctions imposed against the Panamanian regime."

However, McAuliffe says in his message that "at this moment, it does not seem likely that this will be resolved satisfactorily in the near future."

The aid and assistance that may be supplied to the employees who may be affected include reimbursement for reasonable costs and services of lawyers they incur or pay in defending the aforementioned legal cases and to honor all properly documented claims for the loss of property that may be seized or sold or is in any other way disposed of during the legal action.

The employees will also be reimbursed for cars that may be seized and the cost of temporary essential transportation at the rate of $154 per week, as announced to the employees in a bulletin dated 15 December 1988.

Another measure includes the granting of reasonable administrative leave for the employees to prepare and appear in court or conduct any other business connected with the court appearances, as announced by the personnel director in a memorandum dated 22 December.

The employees will be given an authorized document stating the amount withheld from their salaries in income and education taxes.

Employees whose houses are seized by the courts to collect these taxes will be granted temporary housing in PCC houses that are vacant and available at the time. They will also be reimbursed for rental of furniture that the PCC charges in connection with this temporary assigned housing.

Other assistance to the PCC employees includes legal information at the PCC legal adviser's office, but the PCC will not hire lawyers to deal with the tax cases and will not grant specific advice in individual cases. In the case of housing for employees whose homes have been seized, the PCC would make arrangements to pay the cost of emergency housing that the affected individuals may obtain locally.

If the employees decide to pay the amounts due in income and education taxes so as to avoid being exposed to attachments, Administrator McAuliffe will make every effort for these amounts to be reimbursed after Panamanian-U.S. relations are normalized. However, at this time he can give no assurance that the reimbursement will be authorized, and a real possibility exists that it may never be authorized.

McAuliffe stated in his memorandum to the PCC employees that their loyal and dedicated service during these turbulent times has been of inestimable value for the canal and, therefore, for Panama, the United States, and world commerce.

Official Criticizes PCC for Withholding Taxes

PA1201191189 Panama City Domestic Service in Spanish 1645 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Ricardo Levy, director general of revenues of Panama's Finance and Treasury Ministry, said yesterday the Panama Canal Commission [PCC] has illegally been taking the Panamanian people's money. During a news conference, he explained the coercive jurisdiction proceedings initiated against those who are not paying taxes to the treasury. As everybody knows, the PCC has been withholding income, social security, and educational taxes from Panamanian PCC employees but has not been handing over these taxes to the Panamanian Government.

This arbitrary measure has caused Panamanian employees serious trouble. They have not been able to get their tax clearance certificates, which are necessary to travel abroad, obtain license plates, or make all kinds of transactions.

FDP Hears Government, PRD Views on Crisis

PA1301033389 Panama City CRITICA in Spanish 12 Jan 89 pp 2, 14

[Text] The seminar for Panama Defense Forces [FDP] captains which began on 10 January at the Victoriano Lorenzo 5th Company enters its 3d day today with an analysis of the country's foreign policy.

Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Maria Cabrera will address the middle commands on Panama's position in the international scene, Third World policy, and Panama's role in the Contadora Group.

After Cabrera's speech, Chief of Staff Colonel Marcos Justine will discuss the military view, and this afternoon's topics will be "Central America's Situation," and "Economic Blockade in Response to the Political Situation."

On 11 January, National Bank Director Rafael Arosemena and Finance Minister Orville Goodin discussed the economy.

Arosemena emphasized that Panama needs more people engaged in small business as a way of starting to solve the current economic situation, which, he admitted, "is very difficult."

Arosemena explained at length the roles played by the national and international banks after the local banking system closed in March. He explained the workings of the clearing house, the use of investment deposit certificates, and barter as a commercial mechanism.

The finance minister, meanwhile, discussed clearly and factually the state's administrative position, stating categorically that "there can be no national liberation or economic independence without a social cost."

Orville Goodin explained the various long- and short-term plans that the Panamanian Government could initiate to recover the 20-percent economic loss it has sustained.

The approximately 100 captains participating in the seminar showed great interest in the subject and asked many questions that were duly answered by Arosemena and Goodin.

The finance minister also said: "We must open our economy to as many markets as possible, regardless of ideologies."

The afternoon session began with an address entitled "Analysis of the Political Strategy," by Nils Castro, a presidential adviser, and Darinel Espino, general secretary of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD).

In the course of his speech, Nils Castro referred to the FDP's role in the democratization process, pointing out that democratization cannot take place without the FDP's nationalist participation. "Neither neutrality, peace, self-determination, nor progress are possible if all foreign forces in the country are not replaced, and that is the Armed Forces' primary function," Castro said.

Darinel Espino, who was recently agriculture minister, presented statistical charts on partisan political activity, stating the PRD's expectations for the approaching May elections.

The policy basis of the civic action programs carried out by the FDP to benefit the neediest sectors was discussed in the evening by Lieutenant Colonel Virgilio Mirones, the General Staff's G-5.

Mirones gave a detailed report on the various programs implemented in 1988 throughout the country and advancing some of this year's programs because, as he pointed out, "civic action does not stop."

Up to last night the captains, divided into six working groups, have been planning a field exercise, planned in accordance with current war theories. This general staff exercise will include the creation of an operational plan.

16 Civilian Opposition Members Still in Prison

PA1301034389 Paris AFP in Spanish 0545 GMT 11 Jan 89

[Text] Panama City, 10 Jan (AFP)—The opposition Panamanian Committee for Human Rights (CDHP) asserted today that 16 civilian political prisoners are still in the country's jails because they were not included in an amnesty decreed by President Manuel Solis Palma in December.

The executive branch's amnesty included 26 citizens who were arrested for "crimes against the state's security," but did not include these 16 civilians or the military officers who were arrested during a foiled military uprising against General Manuel Antonio Noriega on 16 March 1988, according to CDHP secretary Dr Jose Manuel Faundez.

Faundez said that the executive branch made a "terrible mistake," because "it is not authorized to pardon political prisoners. Only the Legislative Assembly" can do that.

He added that the prisoners include Professor Diana Mirella Del Rio de Vapres, sister of Major Moises Del Rio, a Panama Defense Forces dissident who now lives in the United States.

Likewise, Faundez explained that the arrested military officers "have the right to be tried by ordinary courts since there is no military court or code in the country."

The military officers mentioned by Faundez include Colonel Leonidas Macias and Majors Jaime Benitez, Luis Carlos Samudio, and Nicolas Gonzalez.

Correction to Review of Political Situation

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Weekly Review of Political Situation," published in the 9 January Latin America DAILY REPORT, page 33, column one:

page 35, column two, paragraphs two and three make read: "In an effort to diversify the country's trade, the Legislative Assembly approved a trade agreement with the USSR on 31 December. Progovernment and opposition legislators had contrary views on the agreement. In remarks published by LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA on 1 January, PRD Legislator Hugo Giraud of the Assembly's Foreign Relations Committee described the trade agreement as "positive" because it expends the markets to which Panama has access. He also announced that a trade agreement will soon be signed with Poland. Panama City Circuito RPC Television on 2 January aired comments by PRD Legislator Rafael Abrego, who said

that the Panama-USSR agreement "has no political connotations" and that in view of the economic situation, Panama needs "the support of and contact with all countries." In the same report, Legislator Jorge Ruben Rosas of the opposition Nationalist Liberal Republican Movement said the agreement is the result of the current problems with the United States. Agreements should be based on the nation's best interests, and this is not the case with the Soviet trade agreement, he noted." ...(omitting extraneous lines)

Bolivia

Congress Approves U.S. Military Support

PY1201192189 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] A congressional majority has approved the resolution authorizing 300 U.S. military technicians and soldiers to enter Bolivian territory.

After an exhaustive, 2-day debate, the majority of the congressional blocs last night approved the draft bill that was submitted by the Potosi legislators.

The resolution was approved by the following political party blocs: ADN; MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left]; MNR; the Christian Democratic Party [PDC]; the Leftist Democratic Party [Izquierda Democratica]; the Revolutionary Vanguard [VR]; and the Bolivian Democratic Party [PDB]. It was rejected by the United Left [IU] and the Socialist Party [PS].

The resolution was read by Senator Alfredo Cuellar:

[Begin Cuellar recording] The Honorable Congress hereby establishes: In keeping with Section 15 of Article No 59 of the Constitution, Congress hereby authorizes 300 technicians and soldiers of the U.S. Armed Forces to enter Bolivian territory and to reside here for 4 months.

The objective of their permanence in Bolivia is to level the Pati Pati Hill, thus allowing the Capitan Rojas airport of Potosi to expand its operations. This is a priority project for the development of Potosi. [end recording]

Three other resolutions were submitted to Congress but they were rejected. Complementary resolutions were also submitted, including one concerning the need to extend the U.S. military and technical cooperation program to other Bolivian regions.

In view of this, Congress approved a resolution submitted by the Chuquisaca congressional bloc which reads: "To authorize the Executive Branch to negotiate before the U.S. Government the extension of the technical cooperation agreement so that the U.S. military engineers, who will work on the improvement of the Capitan Rojas airport in Potosi, may be allowed to work on the extension of the airstrip of the Juana Azurduy airport in Sucre.

It must be noted that a few days ago the Senate approved a resolution establishing the need to expand U.S. military-technical cooperation to improve the Oruro airport and other important works.

Grenade Explodes at Interior Minister's House

PY1201150289 La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 6 Jan 89 p 25

[Text] Santa Cruz, 5 Jan (ANF)—An unusually large number of policemen have been deployed over the past few hours around the house of Interior Minister Juan Carlos Duran in the residential neighborhood of Equipetrol in Santa Cruz. Local authorities declined to issue a report on the matter.

Despite the deployment of the police, the Departamental Police did not issue any report. Neighbors have reported that a powerful bomb exploded early yesterday in the house, and that the policemen showed up afterwards.

The neighbors believe that a grenade was thrown from outside the house.

The interior minister tonight confirmed the attack on his house in Santa Cruz. He said that this house has been leased and that investigations are being conducted to determine who carried out the attack and what their motives were.

The minister declined to give additional details until the investigations are concluded. He denied, however, that police were deployed after the attack.

Regulation for Law on Coca Crops Approved

PY1201214589 La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 5 Jan 89 pp 1, 8

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] The government has approved the regulation corresponding to law 1008 on Special Regulations for Coca and Controlled Substances, which was approved by Congress last year. The Executive Branch enacted the law through Supreme Decree No 22099 of 28 December 1988.

The regulation is divided into 8 different titles, various chapters, and 52 articles basically referring to special regulations for coca and controlled substances, to preventive measures, and to programs of international cooperation in this field.

The decree implementing the special regulations for coca and controlled substances states that:

"On 22 July 1988 the constitutional government enacted Law 1008 approved by Congress. The transitory article of the first title of that law empowers the executive branch to draw up the corresponding regulation, in keeping with Article 96-1 of the Constitution, which establishes that the executive branch has the power to execute and safeguard the execution of laws through decrees."

"Whereas the following regulation will be instrumental in adequately implementing Law 1008 on Special Regulations for Coca and Controlled Substances, the Council of Ministers hereby decrees that:"

Article 1. The regulation of Law 1008 on Special Regulations for Coca and Controlled Substances is fully approved."

Article 2. Any law contradictory to the current supreme decree is hereby abolished. The ministers of foreign affairs; interior, migrations, and justice; agriculture, livestock, and campesino affairs; defense; education; and health are in charge of its implementation.

The most important articles of the regulation on alternative development and the replacement of coca crops state that:

"Article 10. The Alternative Development Undersecretariat is responsible for planning and implementing the program to reduce coca crops in keeping with Law 1008 and for drawing up and implementing the Coca Crops Replacement and Development Program (PIDYS)."

Article 11. The Alternative Development Undersecretariat, through its technical branches, will mark the areas, register and issue the corresponding licenses to coca producers, and conduct the regional and local programs that fall within the PIDYS framework."

Article 12. The Alternative Development Undersecretariat, through its technical branches, will establish and administer the annual goals, the economic compensation system, and the registration for voluntary coca crop reduction. This reduction will be carried out parallel to the program for local, subregional, and regional development, within the PIDYS framework and subject to the availability of national and international resources in keeping with Chapter 3 of Law 1008."

Article 13: PIDYS will be the operative tool to expand the regulations established by Law 1008 and will involve programs for the control of coca production and replacement crops, for economic reactivation, for regional development, and for social participation."

Article 14. Implementation of PIDYS will be carried out with the support of the producers throughout its various phases. To expand the program, the Alternative Development Undersecretariat will establish regional, subregional, and local PIDYS committees."

Article 15. The National Alternative Development Fund will be subject to special regulations established by the Alternative Development Undersecretariat."

Article 16. The coca producers who voluntarily participate in the reduction and replacement program will report to the special department of the Alternative Development Undersecretariat within the framework of the PIDYS. Those peasants who do not produce coca leaves and are settled in zones A and B established by Article 8 of Law 1008 are also entitled to benefit from the alternative development program. Economic compensation will be either individual or collective, but priority treatment will be granted to projects of an economic or social nature."

On Controlled Substances

On Crimes and Penalties

"Article 24. The penalties for drug-related offenses will never exceed 30 years imprisonment, as established by Article 17 of the Constitution."

"Article 25. Minors under the age of 16 who are found guilty of drug-related crimes as defined by Law 1008 will be sent to special centers until they are completely rehabilitated."

"Article 26. The maximum amount of drugs that a person can claim for personal use will be determined by two medical experts—identified by Article 49 of Law 1008—as the amount that can be used by one person in 48 hours. Any excess will be considered drugs for trafficking."

"Article 27. Any person who uses his personal property or real estate for the production, storage, transportation, sale, or use of any controlled substances, and/or authorizes or accepts the consumption of controlled drugs, will be penalized according to Article 71 of Law 1008."

"Article 28. All personal property, real estate, or vehicles used for transport by land, river, or air which are seized during drug-related investigations that are not claimed after a period of 30 days will become the legal property of the National Council for the Control of Use and Traffic of Illegal Drugs."

"Article 29. When considering the crimes of supplying or consuming drugs, the courts will consider as aggravating or extenuating circumstances the way, form, amount, quantity, time, place, and situation in which the crime was committed."

"Article 30. Owners or lenders of real estate are in violation of the law and must be penalized when:

1. Officials find airstrips on the premises—finished or under construction—not authorized by the Aeronautics Ministry.

2. Airplanes land or take off without the authorization of the Aeronautics Ministry, or without a real or justified reason, unless the pilot gives immediate notice to the nearest civilian, military, or police station.

3. The owners or lenders of areas where airstrips have been built with the authorization of the Aeronautics Ministry do not immediately notify the ministry of the landing or taking off of airplanes."

The Work of the Court Police

Court Arguments and Rulings

"Article 32. A report on the operations carried out by the Court Police in the provinces and municipalities, and the individuals arrested as a result of these operations, must be placed at the disposal of the closest district special narcotics force within 48 hours."

"Article 33. The 48-hour period mentioned in Article 97 of Law 1008 refers to each special individual so the police can complete their investigation."

"Article 34. The Court Police report will include the following documents:
A. A note identifying the source of the report.
B. A note justifying the arrest of each individual.
C. A preliminary report on the investigation.
D. A detailed report on the operation.
E. Documentation detailing what was seized.
F. Documentation indicating the weight of the seized drugs.
G. A laboratory analysis report.
H. Complementary pictures.
I. Testimony of the people involved in the illegal activity.
J. Other documents that can be used as proof.
K. A report of face-to-face testimonies, if appropriate.
L. A document on conclusions.
L1. Documentation of remittal of dossier to the court."

Correction to Government Renegotiation of Debt

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Government Confirms Renegotiation of Debt," published in the 6 January Latin America DAILY REPORT, page 20, column two:

last paragraph, only sentence make read: ...to $241.1 million by April and then hopes to do something similar with its Latin American bilateral creditors, including Argentina and... (changing word "until" to "by" and changing word "debtors" to "creditors")

Brazil

'Groundless' Reports on Libyan Factory Denied

PY1201131089 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 11 Jan 89 p 15

[Text] Brasilia—Itamaraty last night released a note denying as "totally groundless" the report that Brazil had allegedly contributed to the construction of the Libyan factory in Al-Rabitah by issuing forged export certificates. The note states that Brazil "does not issue certificates of destination on exports from the country." However, in its repeated denials of weapon exports to Iran and South Africa, the Brazilian Government has always argued that it fully controls the final destination of war materiel exports. The Libyan case is not the first time Brazil has been involved in this type of charge.

The AFP report that Brazil is allegedly exporting equipment for a Libyan chemical weapons factory by issuing forged export certificates elicited no comment from Brazilian officials in Paris participating in a conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The accusation released by AFP was made by Netherlands journalist Frank de Jong, staff writer of a newsletter for the embassies in The Hague called the MEDIA MONITOR [preceding two words in English]. According to De Jong, Libya has been helped by false certificates of destination for equipment supplied by Brazil. The direct export of this equipment to Libya has been restricted. According to the journalist, the Netherlands secret service (BVD) has been aware of Libyan plans to manufacture chemical weapons for more than 2 years.

CACEX [Foreign Trade Department] sources yesterday explained the export license process for any foreign operation. The license issued by CACEX has 65 items that must be filled in, including: country of destination, place where the license was issued, names of the exporting and importing companies, form of payment, port of shipment, whether the merchandise will go through other countries before its final destination, and transport means—whether by land, sea, or air.

Presidential Secretary Resigns Due to Reform

PY1201220489 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 2 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] On 11 January, President Jose Sarney's private secretary Jorge Murad stepped down after submitting his irrevocable resignation on 9 January.

Murad left despite Sarney's request to reconsider his decision. Murad, who was one of the most influential presidential advisers, does not agree with the scope of the current ministerial reform. He also did not like the dismissal of his friend Mauricio Viotti from the CEF [Federal Savings Bank]. Sarney is expected to eliminate the Ministries of Health, Science and Technology, Land Reform, Administration, Housing, and Irrigation, and to replace the ministers of justice and of the interior.

President Appoints First Female Labor Minister

PY1201230689 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Excerpt] Today President Jose Sarney appointed Dorothea Werneck as the new labor minister. This is the first time that a woman has been appointed labor minister in Brazil.

Werneck is a career SEPLAN [Secretariat for Planning] official and represents the government in the social pact negotiations. Werneck, who is an economist from Ponta Nova, Minas Gerais, will replace Minister Ronaldo Costa Couto, who has been acting labor minister since Almir Pazzianotto was appointed to the Superior Labor Court. Dorothea Werneck will be sworn in tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Sarney Appoints New CEF Bank President

PY1201230989 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 12 jan 89

[Text] President Jose Sarney today appointed economist Paulo Rubens Mandarino as the new president of CEF [Federal Savings Bank]. He was vice president of operations of the Bank of Brazil since August 1987. He is replacing Mauricio Viotti.

Finance Minister Denies Rumors of Price Freeze

PY1201150989 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 0900 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Excerpt] Finance Minister Mailson da Nobrega again denied rumors that the government will freeze prices to control inflation. He believes that currently the best way to control inflation is to establish in advance the monetary correction percentage to be applied to salaries and prices. Nobrega also said the government's economic sector is studying the suggestions made by the labor union and private economists regarding the establishment of prices and salaries at a 15-percent index. The minister, who said that no decision on the index has been reached so far, explained that the government is ready to discuss the index percentage with the businessmen. [passage omitted]

New 3d Military Region Commander Installed

PY1201233189 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] General Luiz Paulo Fernandes de Almeida has been installed as the new commander of the 3d Military Region, headquartered in Porto Alegre. The region falls under the jurisdiction of the Southern Military Command.

Gen Fernandez de Almeida replaces General Luiz Guilherme de Freitas Coutinho, who has been appointed Army deputy secretary of economy and finance. The swearing-in ceremony was attended by Governor Pedro Simon, Prefect Olivio Dutre, the commanders of the 5th Naval District and of the 5th Regional Air Command, and generals stationed in Rio Grande do Sul.

Colombia

Barco Address on Talks With M-19 Guerrillas

PA1301044889 Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 0239 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Speech by President Virgilio Barco; date and place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] Fellow citizens, I am addressing you to explain the most recent activities concerning the maintenance of public order that have been carried out in the country.

On 1 September 1988, I announced a peace initiative. This initiative is the expression of the government's intention to keep its hand extended to those armed groups which are truly interested in demobilizing, laying down their weapons, and returning to democracy. This initiative is an open door to peace.

The government's reconciliation policy, included in the peace initiative, guided the dialogue with the guerrilla groups. Certain specific criteria were defined before beginning the dialogue. First, it was essential for the guerrilla movement to realize the fact that the basic purpose of the dialogue is its demobilization in order to guarantee lasting and stable peace.

To begin the dialogue, the government also demanded that the guerrilla groups show their desire for reconciliation through their behavior.

Although some believed it was better to begin a dialogue immediately and without conditions and demands, the government chose to be cautious.

The M-19 declared a unilateral truce, which has lasted over the last 4 months, thus proving its desire for reconciliation. For that reason, the national government agreed to hold direct talks with the M-19 in order to agree on a schedule that could lead to the M-19's demobilization and its incorporation into the country's democratic life.

These talks were held in Tolima Department last weekend. Presidential adviser Rafael Pardo, his advisers, and Carlos Pizarro Leongomez, representing the M-19, participated in the talks. This effort by these officials of the presidency gives us hope for finding political paths leading to reconciliation.

Several points were agreed upon as a result of the dialogue. I want to mention those points now.

As you recall, the government's peace initiative stressed the fact that the dialogue's objective is to talk with the armed groups about the phases of their demobilization and permanent incorporation into the country's democracy. An essential point for the government has always been that the guerrilla groups must show their willingness for peace. How can they show that willingness for peace? They can do that by not conducting terrorist actions and by declaring unilateral cease-fires. The peace initiative was designed in such a way that the opinions of the various socials groups, and mainly of the political parties, could be taken into account.

The document issued at the end of the talks between the presidency officials and the M-19 leaders in Tolima includes the aforementioned basic criteria. Therefore, for the various guerrilla groups to hold talks with the government, it has been established that it is necessary that the guerrilla groups declare a unilateral cease-fire for a moderate length of time.

The various guerrilla groups must recognize that the ultimate objective of any dialogue is to march freely along a path to their disbandment. There can only be dialogue as long as it develops in a climate of total clarity and absolute commitment to peace. At the same time, we foresee the need to let the different guerrilla groups hold discussions and seek support for their ideas and plans.

In the peace initiative, public hearings were considered a useful mechanism for that purpose. We now consider it feasible to hold talks within a certain period of time and with an agreed agenda. The party leaders or their representatives and the guerrilla leaders who have abided by the agreed conditions will be able to participate in the talks. These talks must be based on the guarantees of the full democracy we have been developing.

The declaration also refers to the M-19's unilateral cease-fire as the expression of its intention to create the necessary climate of detente. In addition, the document announces that the government has identified issues and dates for drawing up the agenda with the M-19. If this agenda is properly implemented, it will promote the M-19's return to democratic life.

The country must know we are seeking a stable and permanent peace, not ambiguous and temporary agreements. Therefore, I must warn that this meeting constitutes only the first step. We are aware that there are no magic formulas for coexistence. The M-19's attitude is different than those of other guerrilla groups, which continue to murder peasants, attack soldiers, and attempt to destroy the economic and democratic commonwealth of Colombians. Those groups announced a cease-fire not to advance toward peace but to arm themselves and increase their terrorist attacks and acts of violence. The public knows well that Jamaican authorities have intercepted a 10-ton shipment of weapons coming from Portugal. The government maintains a steady hand regarding rebels who have not proven their sincere commitment to democratic life with unequivocal actions. The authorities will continue to fully implement measures to restore order. Citizens must fervently support the authorities and actively cooperate with them against subversion, terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime, as the government has done. Fellow countrymen, the amendments we are carrying out, the government reconciliation policy, and the peace initiative I proposed to the country on 1 September 1988 are drawing us closer to the solid and stable peace that the overwhelming majority of Colombians demand.

We will not achieve peace tomorrow, or in a week—and it may take much longer. However, recent developments constitute a significant step toward coexistence. With strict respect for the Constitution and the law, and loyalty to the commitments I made with the Colombian people, I will keep trying to bring closer the peace for which I have been striving since I took office. Thank you.

Peru

Soviet Official Discusses Fishing Contract

PY1301024989 Lima Television Peruana in Spanish 0100 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Interview with Soviet Fisheries Ministry representative (Oleg Kashev) by unidentified reporters on 12 January at the port of Callao—(Kashev) speaks in Russian with passage-by-passage translation into Spanish]

[Text] [Reporter] How many Soviet fishing ships are there in Peruvian waters, ready to leave and begin operations?

[(Kashev)] At this port there is only one ship ready to begin fishing operations.

[Reporter] Where are the other ships?

[(Kashev)] The other ships anchored in Callao will not operate in Peruvian waters. The ships that will operate in Peruvian waters are now at sea. They are waiting for Peruvian authorization to begin the implementation of the fishing contract.

[Reporter] What is the official position of the Soviet Fisheries Ministry regarding the fact that the contract is not being implemented?

[(Kashev)] We have a single official position. We are very respectful of the laws and the customs of the countries with which we work. We will wait until you solve your own affairs.

Shining Path Kills 4 Policemen at Chiquian

PY1201145189 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0450 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Excerpt] Lima, 11 Jan (EFE)—Police sources have reported that the Shining Path terrorist group today killed four Republican Guard members in an attack in Ancash Department.

The Republican Guard members—an officer and three agents—were attacked with firearms and explosives while they were guarding the electric power plant at Chiquian, 409 km north of Lima. The sources did not make clear whether the plant was destroyed or simply damaged during the attack. [passage omitted]

Uruguay

First Cargo Ship Leaves Falklands for Continent

Montevideo Possible Destination

PY1201165289 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1414 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Montevideo, 12 Jan (TELAM-ANSA)—An Uruguayan radio reported today that the refurbished private cargo ship "Indiana I" today left the Malvinas Islands for Montevideo or Punta Arenas (Chile), marking the first transport service between the islands and the continent since the confrontation between Argentina and Great Britain.

Radio Carve, which had a telephone contact with a British official on the Malvinas Islands, reported that the ship left Puerto Argentino at 0900 local time [1100 GMT], but failed to report whether it will first stop in Montevideo or in Punta Arenas.

The "Indiana I" is sailing under a Bahamian flag; it has a displacement of 2,500 metric tons and a capacity 80 containers and some 12 passengers.

The British official contacted by Radio Carve said she does not know the exact number of passengers aboard the ship, which is carrying a load of frozen fish and perishable products.

A Montevideo port source said that so far no request for docking the ship in Montevideo has been received, and this is something that takes 24 hours. The source added that if it arrives without the appropriate permission, "it will have to anchor outside the port."

Support for Argentina Reiterated

PY1201224389 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spaish 2209 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 12 Jan (TELAM)—The Uruguayan Government today reiterated its support for Argentina's claim of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, which are occupied by Great Britain. It made it clear that it has not authorized, nor will it authorize, the establishment of a regular line between Montevideo and the archipelago.

In its Foreign Ministry communique, the government of the neighboring country also warned that "it will continue to respect its historic tradition of freedom of ports and that, within current regulations and usages, it will provide port services to vessels of any flag or origin and for any destination while in peaceful transit and in legitimate commercial service."

Designation of Cuban Ambassador Approved

PY0901204089 Montevideo LA HORA in Spanish 5 Jan 88 p 3

[Summary] The Uruguayan Government has agreed to the designation of Abelardo Curbelo Padron, 48, as Cuban ambassador to Uruguay.